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The
Nationality Question and National Democratic Programme |
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Revisiting the debate on
Yoga's thesis: The Nationality Question and National Democratic
Programme Nationality
Question 1. 'Nationality Question' is
a study in the 'historical development of society' discourse to discover
the 'laws' of social development. The 'laws' so derived are a tool,
which understanding, they argue, enriches the thoughts of those plotting
socio-economic and cultural improvements. 2. 'Nationality Question, approached horizontally, begs for a political surgery on how social relations thread - that is how different nationalities web into one another during their social, cultural and economic intercourse. At the back end of this, concessions (neighbourliness and civility) thrive to operationalise an embryonic social solidarity. The front end adorns all sorts of exhibitions to shore up the imagery of different nationality-specific identities. Such things as 'nation-state' or 'political-state' are likely to be founded in the process of strengthening social solidarity, if wrongly tweaked could impede any embryonic political programmes. 3. 'National Democratic programme', suggests a vertical integration of a defined minimum national political consensus from which a society can converge to advance its political programme(s). To do this individuals or groups of persons sharpen their respective political manifesto for advancing society. The assumptions being that; (a) an embryonic 'social solidarity' exists, and; (b) a 'national democratic programme' does not threaten to deface the front-end identities of the different nationalities. If these are uninteresting to the competing opinions to pursue, experience suggests that forging a political unity is a winner (by any means necessary) take all and (to be really violent) losers go to Luzira University. 4. A state is about
jurisdiction and control over all persons and in all causes within a
defined territory. 'Nation-state' may be of a single nationality in that
state. In the context of all the above and this discussion, a 'nation
-state' is about distinctiveness of cluster of nationalities from that
of its neighbours with a specific influence in the way life is organised
- an embryonic social solidarity is present. Here there will be a higher
content of taboos, myths, and cultural perspective as rudimentary
methods of self-control, with attendant tension and conflagration as the
unintended consequences of interpretations and implementation. The art
of managing this is 'politics' that massages and relaxes the
confrontational thinking, reorganising it to function by reasoning that
is tempered by past mistakes. The outcome is a 'political-state' that
operates along the lines of examining 'more than one side to a story'
and implements 'acceptable decision'. A proper synthesis of social solidarity may offer a synthetic 'national democratic programme' an opportunity 'arise and shine'. A thesis that vertically integrates a 'nationality question' with a 'national democratic programme' along the line of a 'nation-state' should exhibit a higher degree of familiarity with the civility and good neighbourliness amongst the nationalities, and be very sensitive to the emotions (both natural and synthetic) that connect them. This would guide 'readers' well through the weakest linkages connecting the different nationalities, and political practitioners, where to carefully tread. A thesis for a horizontal understanding of the 'nationality question' can only reveal a society's paradigm shift from its natural threading through sharing worldly endowments, immigration, and assimilations into a qualitative 'plan-driven' society. A thesis that fates 'nationality question' along the line of a 'nation-state' that it impedes a 'national democratic programme' is calling for a mechanical solidarity between nationalities - that is a 'planned-driven society' or a 'predictable social order'. The NRA-cabal is already championing this by whittling down political practices that may strengthen a 'political-state' born out of social solidarity. A thesis that aims to advance a 'political-state' can only approach the 'nationality question' from the angle of advancing and securing the right and proper relationship between nationalities. This is captured into what is called a 'Constitution' (to be constantly reviewed) under-girded by unity in diversity as the basic principles. As it were the NRA-cabal, fellow travellers and all students of 'social relations' discourse yearning for a 'planned' social order, find this approach to 'nationality question' an impediment to their 'national democratic programme'. Case
1: Mamdani, Nabudere and Yoga Collage? Astride the 'nationality
question' along the lines of a 'political-state' with a 'national
democratic programme', is a classic Marxist discourse to organise the
course of history. This suggests that it is the fluctuating opinions of
given nationalities that make it difficult to implement a 'national
democratic programme', implying the opinion must be 'organised in'.
Yoga's 'thesis' may be suggesting that the UPC political promises is
impeded by, for example, a fluctuating 'Ganda aspirations and emotions'
(mine interpretation), so some salivating action must be taken to smash
it. Accordingly, it is then possible to plot Uganda's future political
path in spite of any other impediment. One has to be sure that after the
UPC has adopted this stance as a robust model, the unintended
consequences of smashing the Ganda fluctuating opinions and the yet to
be discovered 'other' impeding 'nationality question', of the 'others',
the party's political programmes cannot be blown off the course. Yoga, Mamdani and Nabudere's
Marxist strands, however 'diverse and seemingly incongruous' they seem
to be, the 'nationality question' theme is central to their political
dogfights. They are on the same side but each target separate and
different social forces and, each profess 'untried' methods to uproot
impediments to their respective political prescription. First, Ugandans
have some experience of political fallouts when a political competitor
seizes the opportunity and unwittingly imposes 'untried' political
palliative on the country. Secondly, Ugandans have learnt how to survive
the violent suppressions of AK-47-wielding 'fortune tellers' ever ready
to 'save the situation from getting worse'. My fears are informed by
Yoga and Okware's virulent denunciations of 'decadent' (mine emphasis)
political programmes comparatively with the experiences Ugandans
underwent during the Nabudere guided 'UNLF-gang of four' 'mayumba kumi';
and now the Mamdani authored NRA 'resistance committees' and 'demystify
the gun' political surgeries, which he has been instrumental in
promoting. This NRA surgical removal of any traces of pre-1996 political
culture from all the facets of society to usher in a new political order
and commensurate political elite is not yet completed. One will
therefore wince at the thought of what some 'well-honed' Yoga and Okware
(may be 'HORNED') 'cadres' will do when expunging the advances of
Mamdani and the 'gang of four' 'national democratic programmes'. From another perspective,
the Yoga 'thesis' may also be casting the 'nationality question' as a
social force to be stopped from challenging the political programme,
direction, or influence of the UPC. To do this the thesis has to present
the 'nationality-in-question' by population size, peculiarity and
proliferation of their language, mannerism, dances, organisation of
their society, pride in their culture, etc., etc., as self-propelling
and unaffected by the social solidarity, as the 'nationality question'.
This brand of 'nationality question', if it is used by the Ganda opinion
makers to thwart views of the 'others' woven in the social solidarity,
may indeed be a minority political force. Well, the less authoritative about politics would argue that role of politics is about guiding all political intentions, especially decadent ones to face the challenges and advancing of political forms of governance. That 'role' is qualitative one, and a decisive factor in sifting socio-economic and cultural constraints to advance society. It can direct social forces playing for a state of civil disorder towards playing a significant role in a state of peaceful co-existence. Where economic forces are deterring the pooling and sharing of resources, it can work out equity or extract concessions to be delegated to and managed by common economic institutions. In an antagonistic environment at the throes of violence, it massages withdrawals from frenetic brinkmanship to a more balanced positive emotion and calmness or intervenes to re-focus minds to accept a tilt in the balance of forces through an election or referendum. The aggregate factor is that in a 'politically-friendly' environment, politics thrives best and allows all forces to redeem their dignity to advance society, unlike in a 'politically-coercive' ('rigid' or 'intolerant') environment where anarchy (kavuyo) reigns best. Inside this 'Nationality
Question' lie many imponderables; to emphasize one such as the 'Ganda
chauvinism' is to suggest that there are 'omitted' others. In 'omitting
others', I will emphasise one organised history of the 1900
Ganda/British agreements as the 'mother' of 'ebyaffe/tugude mu bintu '
and not 'for the others'. Amongst the 'omitted others' may be the
mystery as to why the British never entered into similar
Nkore/Nyoro/Toro/ British protection agreement, which suggestively,
would have made them also to 'eat' the 'chosen' status, or would it? In
this scenario, a thesis on a 'nationality question' along any line of
investigation would now offer some effective comparative 'emotions and
aspirations' to study as impediments to a 'national democratic
programme'. Given the above
imponderables, there may be need to further establish the importance the
Ganda opinion leaders attached to, or what the British aimed at, in
crafting the 1900 Ganda/British agreement. The devil may be in
discovering the unintended outcome of that agreement as it may have a
direct bearing to an erroneous emphasis that indeed the Ganda
aspirations and emotions, which as of now is condemned as capable, or
equal, and worse, can even impede a 'national democratic programme'. The, but debatable
assumption of the origin of this 1900 Ganda agreement is that it was
crafted in the context of an emerging 'political-state' of Uganda.
Whatever the merits or demerits of the argument, the unintended
consequences of demarcating the 'we' from 'them' generated emotions that
needs to be well studied, understood and satisfactorily explained. In
this context some of the concern should be about the disruption to the
social solidarity amongst the nationalities as individuals and groups
negotiated their ways around socio-economic and cultural constraints.
Another is the construction of a 'chosen' people mind-set in Ganda
opinion leaders that quickly percolated to the immediate subordinates
who may have unquestionably responded and built a behaviour pattern that
qualifies to be referred to as 'chauvinism' (?). May be this is a
Ganda-specific culture in need of guidance by an astute political party,
in which case there may be some redeeming value to it. I am using the
'chosen' phenomena in the context of King James' 'authorised' historical
development of society' version in the Bible. 'Omitted others' may be
the well-planted records now being pandered to as accurate historical
interpretations that reveal similar notion such as 'predestination';
'siege mentality'; of being 'hated'; of being 'special'; 'containment
policy'; isolationist politics', etc., which have been bandied around
and applied to defend (by the Ganda friends) or execute (by Ganda
enemies) the Ganda as a people. If the Ganda were a 'chosen'
nationality, it would not have been for their political mastery but for
a very British use of an effective tool to 'divide and rule'. If the
'chosen' business is not a British creation, 'Kirimutu' must be
consulted for the evidence. As it were the Ganda were going about their
backyard business and arguably, quite capable of looking after their
own, never went to the Englanders to seek for this 'protect us' from
'the others'. May be the Ganda 'chauvinism' was so pristine and
harnessable for political purposes, hence the need for 'protection'. To
be sure, a thesis may be necessary to 'unpack' the 1900 Ganda agreement
to assess the damage this caused to the psyche of the Ganda nation. It
may also further explore whether or not this 'chosen' business was
intentionally cultivated as a counter weight to the emergence of
political parties in Uganda, as the wealth was being stolen. The
suspicion is that inside this 1900 Ganda agreement may lie the British
Imperial traders' interests, who in wanting to raise capital from
'English Names' to develop their South East Asia trading outposts, found
the collateral in the well-organised Ganda tax collecting system. Should
the preceding surmises be plausible the UPC can as well champion for
compensation from Britain for the grief the Ganda 'chafadi' throughout
the extortionist taxation period. Failing that, the party should be free
to whip up the sentiments of all other 'nationalities' to 'kuwanika
emikono' in demanding 'reparation' on behalf of the Ganda. Failing that,
for arguments sake, to champion the Ganda 'chauvinism' as a British
hoodwink while the imperial traders pilfered the Ganda taxes. Anyway, this 1900
Ganda/British Agreement could have been 'imposed' whether or not Uganda
existed as a state of sorts. To date there is no evidence of a Ganda
mass endorsement of this 'agreement' that purportedly organised the
Ganda IN and others OUT, therefore those peddling this as a fact may
have to make their intention clear as to why they are doing so. In this
context, without a convincing elaboration, a ubiquitous blaming of the
whole Ganda people, who may have been sleepwalked into a violent
political confrontation on an ill-judged opinion is a violent pen
assault to the already economically injured. The choice of what the
thesis emphasises, in respect of the 'nationality question' should rest
on Yoga being either very (a) familiar (and emotionally detached) with
the sequencing of events that lead to its' isolation as a political
impediment or; (b) sensitive (and emotionally attached) on this issue as
impinging on his political leaning. To do both demands an acrobatic
display of neutrality by filtering out own prejudices and agenda at each
stage of data gathering by signposting the other critiques or
researchers who may wish to test the thesis for robustness. Without some
semblance of (a) or (b) a 'nationality question' thesis can as well be a
party political manifesto, which functionally is intended to be familiar
and sensitive to issues, which does demand testing for robustness.
Ideally the UPC should be more empathetic with the Ganda being used as a
guinea pig to create a 'political-state', and to 'protect' her from
being crucified for her naivety or the British needs. To cut off this case at this point, the readings of the Ganda/Nyoro/Kitara wars, have as yet to convince me that the pre-1900 wars the Ganda were motivated by some immemorial 'chosen' mind-set, which drove them to attack, occupy and civilise their infidel or primitive neighbours and those yonder. Primordial tingling induces a feeling that the Ganda being better militarily organised may have provoked wars to acquire wealth and wealth creating means and of course to protect the spoils as the best form of defence. Whenever they were defeated or robbed of their spoils, one wonders what effect this had on the Ganda psyche as a 'chosen' people! Practice dictates that 'generals' do not leave it to the 'gods' to restore and protect their spoils ('ebyaffe') from being contaminated by infidels. No, they organise militarily to retake what they want and such cyclic wars do produce renegade, prodigal, and loyal 'generals'. As for renegades, they are usually bribed by showers of congratulations and promotions ('nyotas') and one cannot rule out a notion that such Ganda 'renegade generals' did not only provoke wars to quench their appetite for warring but found conditions for being wanted. For 'prodigal generals', they are usually enticed into sharing and repatriating their new spoils to motherland to compromise the demands from them to recant their misdeeds otherwise they can be excommunicated or disinherited from their ancestry or heritage. As for the 'loyal generals' with AK-47-type-weapon-wielding-bodyguards, it is not unknown that they nefariously push their own militarist argument on how the state should loosen the economic purse strings to swell their belly, they as well pursue socio-political and cultural goals. It is this accumulated experiences sourced from tales re-told about military exploits that probably weighs heavily on the Ganda opinion drivers when they threaten opponents to achieve their objectives. The unintended outcome of this is that the Ganda opinion leaders have no institutionalised opinion and wealthy of experience in the art of democratic persuasion resulting in the tendency to snuggle up with militarist and militants who pays them with the mirage ('byoya bya nswa') of what they want. The effort to bend the Ganda opinion leaders to pursue for the tangibles by democratic persuasion should therefore be weighted for a common good. Alternately, it is also
possible that Ganda opinion leaders having stumbled on this 'chosen'
business according to the 'King James' authorised Bible found a tool to
cement their iconic role in the Ganda society. Unintentionally they shut out the Ganda masses from participatory politics until Dr Obote made more than an attempt to wake them up to this fact. It may be that as Dr Obote tried to free the masses from the clutches of Ganda opinion drivers, fearing to loose their well-crafted iconic role, they whipped Ganda 'emotions' to resist the suppression of the opinion leaders aspirations to hold the Ganda opinion at ransom. Suggestively some Ganda opinion drivers were rich enough to know the economic benefits of a 'chosen' ideology to establish dynasties along economic lines. Anyway, if this economic muscle skewed the Ganda opinion leader's own view into thinking that they were politically central in the Uganda body politic, this can be massaged and relaxed so that they use their muscle to heave themselves into functioning along the phenomena of 'political guidance' (democratic) and not 'political centrality' (militarist). The option of applying shock therapy or condemnation only creates 'siege mentality' giving this 'chosen' business a life extension, which is still being oxygenated by some celebrated and significant opinion leaders, opinion makers and, excellent and oft-quoted authors who love the Ganda to death who are actually killing them in the process. To go further than these caboodle of persons to write a thesis that guillotines a non-existent 'chosen' mindset, and replace with a 'chosen' synthetic 'national democratic programme' is neither a revolutionary nor a methodological way to develop qualitative politics. However, one senses some paradigmatic angle to this, which will not be dealt with here. Conclusively a thesis prescribing a 'chosen' 'national democratic programme' owned by, for example, the UPC to propel the social, cultural, economic advances, one would argue, injures the party's effort to operationalise qualitative politics. More so, it renders politics itself impotent as a force, which the UPC at its command could use to guide all political aspirations from whichever nationality. It also puts the UPC and the Ganda aspirations and emotions on the same pedestal as rival political positions vying to inherit rulership of Uganda, therefore a powerful version of and for FEDERO waiting to be written as a FEDERO political manifesto. Case
4: Political Parties - vertical notion To realise a 'national
democratic programme' the affected competing political opinions must
embrace it. Such programme may be UPC driven but cannot be its exclusive
programme, if it were, it would not be a 'national democratic
programme'. The only emphasis I would attach to 'national' in a
'political-state Uganda' is that the UPC is a nationally spread party;
everything it pursue or champions is a 'nationally-intended' agenda; it
strives to have all her programmes adopted by all competing political
opinions for the enjoyment of all. On its programme being adopted, the
UPC should see that it has played a decisive part and, apart from
championing the outcome for further development, should not make further
claim to its ownership. To do so is to set up the successful programmes
for toppling or dismantling, as the NRA are so doing now. However, the
party must take responsibility for the programmes that fail or has
failed to push through. This may be the sharp end of the party's
political transcendence in all facets of society to ensure that
political struggles are consolidated to translate socio-economic and
cultural concerns into political concerns, and thereafter into political
demands, likewise from opinion makers inculcate into them the essences
of political leadership. Excellent records elsewhere and on the UPCNet,
show that the UPC is a good and deserving offspring of the father and
mother of Uganda politics and Buganda was the nursery that nurtured her
transformations. As Uganda was being born, the Ganda too were there
bearing the pains of those birth pangs and have attendant scars and
stretch marks to show for it, and all these must collectively celebrated
by all nationalities. Out of this, the UPC and DP can be said to be more
than distinctive in articulating the different political angles to
advance the politics of Uganda. This in itself may be a political
paradigm of a qualitative change from opinion shaping into organisation
and then national political leadership. A 'national democratic
programme' thesis that fates a nationality 'emotions and aspirations' as
impeding a political party programme will sit rather uncomfortably with
the above assertions. As it were, the UPC with its
mandated political promises, aimed to emancipate all other forces in
society to enjoy 'matunda ya Uhuru'. The celebrated outcome of this is
the political pluralism and attendant institutions to promote and defend
the right for all to freely associate. This has not been well
consolidated because the impediments thrown at the UPC from different
and unyielding internal and external forces to her political guidance
has stunted the growth of qualitative politics. Despite this fluidity in
the political environment the UPC or DP, however timidly, still strive
to display respective political manifesto rather than labels of mother
social forces. This is an evidence of a de-clutching and an onward match
to plural politics and freedom of association. With lack of continuity
in plural politics held asunder by definite social forces, it is
essential to loosen this stranglehold by some political consensus or
convergence in the political leadership and political parties on the
'chosen' route to the rulership of Uganda. Paradoxically, it is not
possible to craft what resembles a 'national democratic programme', and,
without it, there will be prolonged difficulties in defending political
pluralism and change of state stewardship through best-offered political
manifesto as willed by majority consent. At this stage of war amongst
social forces, there is also 'honing' the frenetic militarists and
militants who on the one hand are paying lip service to political
guidance from the political parties and attendant leadership while
readying themselves for the next round of war dances. 'A' 'national
democratic programme' propagated by students from this school can only
be a 'predestination' notion, which should be developed and polished to
stand on its own, but not as an attachment to any political party. To date, I suspect that each
of the 'arrested' leading political parties cling on to their own
political manifesto on how each can make advances in social, economic
and cultural spheres. A thesis is therefore necessary to found a platform to advance this concept of a 'national democratic programme'. A thesis that aims to 'arrest' the Ganda psyche or condemns it as an impediment to party political programme prolongs the process of developing qualitative politics and that of the period of 'kavuyo' politics. To pursue this option, thesis generators should be aware that what the illogical things the Ganda are good, such as in 'politics' of 'crowd emotions' and 'Kirimutuism' may be out of synch with and beyond comprehension of a 'prescription thesis'. Suffice to add that the Ganda opinion drivers are good at manipulating the Ganda psyche, to hold sway over their subjects (crowd mentality) as well as to snuggle up with different 'personal-merit' militarist/militant suitors without loosing credibility. To undercut this some fancy footwork and foot intelligence work to uncover what really 'tickles' the Ganda masses may be done, which findings can be tailored in the social, cultural, and economic compartments of the UPC political manifesto. Case
5: Political Parties - horizontal dilemma The DP/UPC political relationship remain distant so none of them can defend the common gains made in establishing plural politics or fan a national uprising to oppose putschist tendencies, let alone to agree on a minimum 'national democratic programme'. Respective social forces that even identify with political parties keenly reject qualitative politics as a force to drive socio-economic and cultural advances. Despite prevalent socio-economic dislocation, the leaders of social forces still revel in the attention they get from cabals at the ready to stunt the growth of qualitative politics, arguably, both delight in arresting political play along democratic lines. In the recent past there are instances where 'trusted' political activists revealed their putschist appetite in a practice-run by making a pre-dawn announcements on the media fanning rudiments of information from and at the behest of 'the admired and the respected others', to impose the 'chosen' wishes on the rest. The Ganda 'chosen' mindset, if it exists, does not therefore singularly oxygenate putschist to undermine political processes, an accusing finger should be well directed to the directors and breeders of militarists and militants, who unknowingly are collectively impeding UPC's mandated programmes. Militarism is still popular and viable enough option to impede any or 'a' 'national democratic programme', there is therefore no case for a more exclusive emphasis on the 'nationality question/Ganda chauvinism' as an impediment to a non-existent 'national democratic programme'. I would like to stake a
claim that UPC operates in the realm of qualitative politics and that it
aims to be nothing else but to operationalise it. To do this, it has to
cajole and nudge leaders of social forces into freeing Ugandan's,
however adverse the political environment, to stick to the political
processes as the viable salvage route to improve a socio-economic and
cultural environment. One may make the following anchors points in
operationalising qualitative politics that the UPC has worked on and in
turn freed themselves from the party, and can claim a place in what
could be a 'national democratic programme'. 1. In seeking electoral
mandate, the UPC always displays its political party manifesto for
public scrutiny. In it the party simply promises to work with the people
to improve the socio-economic and cultural lives of the country at their
pace. It is a humbling exercise that has been carried out with humility. 2. Honoured with plural
politics, the electors have always given the UPC some limited but
working majority to implement their manifesto promises. The proviso
being that the party has to re-seek any further mandate on unrealised
promises, which opportunity putschists have, persistently, denied the
party. 3. The draw back is the
excessive arguments in the body politic that seek for information to
justify why the party and indeed all political parties are right or
wrong for the sake of it. In the case of UPC to pre-empt the people's
judgement on the party's success or failure to deliver its electoral
promises. It magnifies the trust people put in the party as equal to
being 'predestined' to the rulership of Uganda, with unintended/intended
outcome of distracting the party from focusing on the electoral promises
within the limited mandate. It also provides slippery reasons seized by
putschists that falsehoods underlie excessive arguments to magnify the
trust people put in the democratic process.
Uganda body politic as of now may need a 'national democratic
programme' along the above anchor points. To illustrate an excessive
argument, if Kakungulu went to Tororo and say killed one Japadhola dead
and whipped a few others, a Japadhola opinion leader present or from
hearsay might fan it as the Ganda people came from abroad and killed
many of 'our people' and made the rest to 'suffer'. Not knowing
differently, the 'respected' Japadhola opinion makers and esterwhile
opinion carriers down the road will propagate this until all the
Japadhola unquestioning are so frenetic that whenever they wish death on
every Muganda they see, or worse, school all others into hating anybody
with name or initials 'Y' or 'Z' as likely to be associated with the
Ganda. You can imagine even the unborn Japadhola armed with tales retold
will find this indignation towards the Ganda without the attendant
reasons explaining the origins of the hatred. Worse, new and unrelated
reasons such as the artistry of planting of Mvule trees to create a
boulevard, construction of 'bulungi bwansi' and trading markets
('katale') are substituted as the hidden intentions of the Ganda
robbery, to perpetuate non-existent hatred. A privileged Japadhola in an
'andaki' and well-primed AK-47, away from prying eyes will get away with
killing any careless traveller who replies 'nze' on the road block
challenge call 'wewe nani''? Another example is a frenetic celebration of logical executive order, such as that of Dr Obote, to a lawfully established force to quell a military rebellion against a mandated government, as a deathly blow to 'chauvinism'. Yet, in the case of the Ganda, possibly 51% of the Ganda opinion drivers were unaware of the conspiracy and may be 90% of the Ganda masses never participated in the rebellious act. Among the participants a crucial 10% may have been paid or given promissory notes to whip up rebellious acts, yet 90% of them may have escaped abroad without talking part and are forever claiming bravery because no one saw escape before the first shot was fired. The 99% who died may never have knowingly taken part in the 'rebellion', they merely followed orders of their superiors. If they knew the whole ramifications of what a rebellion entails, some of them might even have refused to participate in the act. The collapse of that rebellion needs to be analysed not so much for the fire power but the level of will to sustain it, which may have been only skin deep. Without in-depth analysis of the Ganda rebellion a thesis long the lines of an excessive argument against 'Ganda chauvinism', as that to be challenged and pursued relentlessly until slain with incontemplatable consequence, an assessment without comparative in-depth analysis of the history may find resonance with gullible readers and will reign supreme. Sacrificed in the wishes to
bestow on the UPC a 'chosen' status and excessive reasons for UPC to be
right for rights sake, is the qualitative role of politics that UPC
champions and the defence of people-centred institutions to nudge social
forces into conceding leadership to politics that does not denigrate or
indignify any nationality. The following may be the anchors of UPC's
legacy to Ugandan people that the party has worked at and in turn freed
themselves from the UPC to claim a place as national assets. 1. Culturally: The UPC
successfully pushed a strategy of celebrating different cultures through
Uganda crafts, the Heart beat of Africa dance troupes and Schools
cultural festivals, National Theatre and Art galleries, Library services
to bring learning to all, Roads building to expedite cultural exchanges,
etc. 2. Socially: The UPC
conceptualised and successfully implemented the infrastructures such as
free Health Service accessible to all. Streamlined and equalised the
schools administration, supervision and syllabuses, Roads to breakdown
physical barriers between nationalities, Coffee shops where the Ugandans
just melee around, reminisce and socialise, and cultural community
Centres for Adult Learning Programmes, Tata lorry schools; Tertiary
learning centres, etc. 3. Economically: The UPC
developed the Uganda Development Corporation that spurred state
investment; Uganda Commercial Bank that supported the private sectors
investment and the Co-operative Bank to help the farmers and
Co-operative Societies - no tribal certificate required; Roads to
facilitate faster inter-community threading into communication and trade
no tribal land excepted; Produce Marketing and National Food Reserve to
ensure full belly before work; Waragi distilleries etc. 4. Politically: UPC has
nudged opinion makers and leaders to respect the Parliament as
legislature, the Judiciary, and the Executive as the component apex of
political governance. This is where many of the attacks against UPC have
been levelled, and I suspect, those with capacity to overturn this are
abdicating from examining the reasons for the insidious attacks that
contributes to the putsch against the UPC political programmes and more
so to keep UPC out of the political fray by the NRA-regime. To examine
this more closely, we may stumble on the reasons why national assets are
being stripped by militarists without even a murmur from the attendant
social forces. Without hard facts, I can only hazard a vile, disgusting
and trite suggestion that as the 'protected' social forces revel in the
undiminished attention to keep agape the social fault lines, the NRA are
busy asset-stripping to forever erase the imprints of the UPC from the
memories of the population. To conclude, given the drive
to improve all facets of society, Ganda aspiration and emotions
included, the UPC has made a difference bit-by-bit in all sectors of
society. It is therefore relevant to study this intellectually enriching
social relations and behaviour of social forces, my fear is the tendency
to emphasize what is identified as a problem in a political phase,
becoming 'the description' and equal to a political process. A political
process is a building culture that cannot be prescribed but worked at.
Political prescription is a pastime for political fortune-tellers. Approaches that link or
conjure a notion that the UPC party is 'predestined' to rule the
country, creates resentments and provides ammunition to other 'chosen'
AK-47 bearing type to come out of the woods and claim to be equal to a
political institutions. Thus they impose themselves on the people and go
on to arrogate the right to write themselves 'as' the Constitution
thereafter freely mount a political referendum as an assault on
political pluralism. A thesis that trudges along predestination lines
may justify the actions of gunmen and go on to prescribe for 'chosen'
gunmen a perpetual rotation of rulership of Uganda amongst themselves. The world is too big for the ordinary mortals to hitch a ride on, that is why its' thorough study led to its reduction and re-shaping to what is baptised as a wheel. The wheel is now manageable and is continually getting easier to ride on, simpler to use and to perform a host of other things, including the task yet to be brought into being. The wheel was never invented, it was brought into being through bit-by-bit engineering and those who did so stopped to claim it as their own, hence the adage 'you cannot re-invent the wheel'. Anyway, no one claims the wheel has replaced or inherited the earth and mere mortals continue to work on the wheel to make life easier for them and it is unlikely that we have heard the last on the improvements of the wheel. Clearly there is no room or time for prophets in the wheel improvement process. |
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