On the other hand, Presidents in the US and Latin American presidential model are very strong but they do not come close to having absolute powers. Presidents nominate candidates for certain offices who are vetted and either confirmed or rejected. In some cases, both the executive and legislative arms of government have nominating power. In the US for example, members of most regulatory agencies must come from both parties - the President nominates his party's choices, and the senate leadership of the other party, its representatives. The same should apply in Uganda.
It is strange that the President in Uganda appoints the Clerk to the National Assembly and dictates when parliament sits. Under a federal system, the legislative branches should have their own service commissions with the power to determine their terms of service, hire and fire staff. The house leaderships should determine their own timetable, as to when the houses will be in session or recess. Presidents have no business meddling in legislative affairs, let alone decide and determine when by-elections should take place. That power should rest exclusively with the house leadership [the electoral commission should not have such powers either]. Many areas in Uganda had no parliamentary representation for so long simply because the President of the day did not see any merit in holding by-elections, yet he was the only one who could determine when such elections could take place.
Under the model proposed here, there will be no need for a Prime Minister and all the numerous deputies. We need a President with some power but not an executive council. Uganda almost had one – there are those of you who remember the disastrous and powerless three man presidential commission in 1980 (Justice Musoke, Justice Nyamuchoncho and Mr. Wacha). It was a farce and we don't need anymore of such gimmicks in Uganda. What then?
It is suggested that we have an elected President, who shall serve for two five-year terms. Such times may or may not be continuous. But in accordance with the cardinal principle of libertarianism, no leader, no government, no person or group can be trusted with much power "powerful is bad". The decentralized Jeffersonian power structure is preferred in Uganda's case. As Jefferson noted "the structure is more important than the individuals exercising the power". Accordingly, presidential powers will be checked and kept in balance by the two houses of the legislature. Uganda's presidents, past and present, educated or otherwise have all been dictators due to lack of strong and independent institutions.
In countries where politicians are accountable, you have institutions that matter. They matter because they exercise sufficient checks and balances to ensure competition for power across the judicial-executive-legislative braches. Any system that might not ensure sufficient competition to preclude the emergence of too much power in too few hands in Uganda must be rejected. The only system that can avoid that is a presidential-congressional {two legislative houses} and NOT the parliamentary system we currently have in place. Under the former, there would be no need for the office of Prime Minister. Although the former system produces fewer incentives for legislative cohesion than the latter, it is far better in ensuring separation of powers within the three branches.
It also means that cabinet members will no longer be ex-officio/members of parliament. A President will nominate her/his ministers from the widest possible pool of her/his party or even outside her/his party. This separation of powers in congressional regime produces SMALLER GOVERNMENTS {emphasis added}, with less waste. Cabinet will no longer meet and bulldoze through any spending, as is currently the norm in Uganda (as it is in other parliamentary systems). Separation of powers with different terms of service enables voters to discipline the politicians, which reduces waste and moderates the tax burden. The sharp conflict of interest among politicians (members of the same political party may not have similar agendas, a President in the US does not always get what he wants even from congressional houses dominated by his party, yet in a parliamentary system, the Prime Minister/President gets whatever the party caucus suggests}. Dr. Obote and Mr. Museveni could/can get whatever they decided/decide without a sweat. That is why Uganda is now hurting, because there was/is too much legislative cohesion, which is not necessarily a good thing. Our history and present times illustrates how things may have been/could be different if we had the proper checks in place. A President should be told "NO, Mr. President" without fear ending up in Luzira or six feet under. This is only possible under a presidential-congressional arrangement. This is so because the institutional design creates the right trade-offs. A well functioning Presidential regime performs better in terms of accountability, thanks to the conflict of interest between the executive and legislature. We are suggesting that members of the lower house face voters every 3 years, senators every 6 years and presidents every 5 years, to avoid collusions that would reap off voters through wasteful expenditures and outright theft, Valley dam style.
How will cabinet ministers then be accountable? Several times during the year, they will have to appear before the relevant house committees for public scrutiny, where they will have to defend/justify their budgetary expenditures/requests. The beauty with this arrangement is, ministry budgets may be held up until full accountability is forthcoming from cabinet members. Note the shift of powers from cabinet to the elected houses of parliament who will have the agenda-setting powers through the powerful standing committees in legislatures (lower house and senate). The houses will vote directly on each budget proposal, thus making it possible to reject one wasteful department's budget without necessarily holding up other departments. Bear in mind that such proposals must mussel support from similar committees in both houses, making collusion much harder, and increasing accountability in the process. Under this arrangement, Ugandans will not miss cabinet (over) rule at all.A presidential-congressional (compared to a parliamentary) system will ensure a more effective separation of powers between different branches, and between different political actors with regard to decision over various policy/spending issues. It should therefore be preferred over the current mix of presidential-parliamentary arrangement in Uganda.
