It is common knowledge that Uganda has had a dark and traumatic history of internecine violence resulting in sufferings throughout the country. On every forum many abhor any more bloodshed—all wish to carry out their activities of living in relative peace. No one, however, wants to talk objectively about the past with attempts to heal. Real peace will not be handed to us on a platter—we must consciously and diligently work for it. Germane to that peace is the need to reconcile and make peace with the past. Federalism will come; multiparty democracy will come as surely as the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. We must not build these on the proverbial sand lest any gale storm brings all our efforts back to where we started.

The British initial contact was with the Ganda who helped them establish a beachhead and spread their influence throughout present-day Uganda. The relationship was mutually beneficial and the Ganda prospered generating a sense of superiority on their part and envy and hatred from other tribes that still simmer to this day. How can we come to terms with this particular era?

While no efforts were being made to patch the North—South divide beyond platitudes about “One Nation, One People”, an illiterate Amin swept to power. Understandably the fervor of the Baganda at this news knew no boundaries of educational levels. I remember, even as a child, rather cruel sarcastic remarks by two Baganda classmates about the fates of the Acholi in early 1971. Soon, however, Amin’s goons struck everywhere in Uganda.

Can Uganda's politics be normalized without meaningful reconciliation?  Is it not true that the practice of reconciliation lags the rhetoric?  We must face up to the challenges of reconciliation in Uganda, and in my view that demands that Ugandans come to understand and recognize the traumatic experiences and the meaning for those affected by each violent episode.

I got the sense that there is today no mechanism by which meaningful political reform can happen in Uganda. Those in power have too much fear of reprisal should they lose power, and those out of power have no intention to desist from such reprisal should they come into power.

Therefore, if I were in power I would have the temptation to fill the government with "my people", but if I were smart I would recognise that such a government could in the long term actually work against the interest of "my people".

It is easy to assume that peoples with longstanding differences will always have such differences. I always quote the French and Germans as an example. Starting in 1614 with the Thirty Years War, the Franco-German frontier was the site of conflict at least once in every generation until 1945. An observer on the scene in 1944, observing the carnage and knowing the history, would reasonably have concluded that this was by nature a permanently hostile frontier. He would be wrong, the French and Germans found a solution to a centuries' old rivalry. Today, a visitor driving across the same frontier would probably not even notice it. Except for small signs reading "Frankreich" or "Allemagne" (unrecognisable words to many English speakers) there is no indication at all, no stop for a check of any kind! 

If I were naïve, I would put my hopes into getting a Muganda equivalent of Museveni into State House, to turn Twariire into Tulidde, so to speak. I have been cured of this viewpoint by a number of observations:

Second, Twariire is a scramble for crumbs. I have had the opportunity to sit on an executive committee of a medium sized hospital, whose budget exceeds that of the Uganda government. That same Uganda government budget, one recalls, is largely made of donated and borrowed money. After 15 years of economic recovery, many public services are performing below their 1962 standard, though the bureaucracies are ten times bigger. I feel no hunger to be in such a scramble, even as a minister.

You have heard many say, I'm sure, that "we would be different in power, we are enlightened". Do not believe it. A government based on military force inevitably drifts into corruption, repression and poverty.

A young graduate was posted to an underdeveloped district as a forestry officer, with instructions to start a reforestation scheme. On the day of his arrival the other officers at the District headquarters invited him to lunch at their club. As they sat down the DC said, "I think you've been sent on a wild goose chase, lad, it'll take fifty years to get anything to grow in this place". At which the young man stood up and said "in that case you must excuse me, sir, if I miss the lunch, I don't have a moment to lose".  The area around Mutare (Zimbabwe) today has some of Africa's most impressive forest plantations.

The same question was touched upon by Prof Nabudere, a veteran politician and political scientist (and no fan of Buganda) in a newspaper article last year, where he observed the organic cohesion of Buganda and wondered how Uganda, which lacks such a cohesion, could deal with it. The previous (1966) solution to the equation was, of course, to dismantle Buganda as a political entity, but that solution ended up bringing down the whole country. Museveni has, in this as in most matters, gone halfway and then sat on the fence, hoping the matter will go away.

Mr. Kibuka touched on the fact that the other political parties (DP etc.) did not come out strongly in support of the UPC rally in Kampala recently [12 Jan. 2002]. This observation actually goes to the heart of the matter of reconciliation. The leaders of DP, and many other Ugandans, would not take part in a struggle to end the NRM rule if that struggle is likely to lead to a return of the UPC to power. They are not alone in this sentiment, if the DP were to produce a credible challenger to Museveni, the UPC's support for that challenger wouldn't materialise. 

The "at least we sleep at nights" logic has one flaw; of course, it assumes that the NRM is capable of maintaining the peace. This assumption is unsupported by the evidence. About 25% of Uganda's area has been a war zone for 16 years, and Kampala is unlikely to remain permanently immune. Besides, the internal cohesion of the NRM and the donor-driven economy are also fragile, and likely to crumble at the same time. At such a time a complete breakdown of the nation will only be prevented by an explicit national consensus on power sharing between ethnic groups, nothing else will do. Every Ugandan clearly understands that political rights or human rights are meaningless if someone else holds power. (No less an authority than Mr. Obote Jr. recently reminded us that in 1967-71 the right of association was guaranteed by the constitution, a statement which left me wordless with amazement but which illustrates the point nicely). 

Many, as you note, have given up on the way of negotiation. I have not because the way of force will lead to Congo or to Yugoslavia. The question of reconciliation therefore is at the heart of the matter of political reform in Uganda. It explains why the changes of regime in 1979 and 1986 have left the nation still facing the same basic problem. Over the last year we have seen that it is quite possible to design a workable administrative system for a reformed Uganda, but where do we go from here?

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Reconcile with whom and why?

1. Every Gwanga in Uganda has a vision for itself and for Uganda that is not compatible with that of any other Gwanga.
2. You cannot have an equitable Uganda unless all the Gwangas have relatively similar political, social and economic objectives  - those with objectional visions will keep them under wraps until they are in power.
3. There is not a single Gwanga in Uganda that chooses to be a part of another Gwanga in the bigger Uganda.

   Any Gwanga that does not have a strong sense of cohesion within itself, or a common vision for itself amongst its own people will always feel threatened and insecure in the larger Uganda.

Negotiation is about trading a piece of my vision for a piece of yours. You cannot therefore start a negotiation with a visionless person! He will mug you!

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